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93.CNT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - EQUAL PROTEOTIoN - DAAGE ACrION FOR
Btn.AcH OF RA rAL. REsnuTaIvE CovENA~NT-Petitioners sued at law for breach
of a racial restrictive covenant,1 alleging that respondent violated the covenant
by conveying restricted realty without incorporating restrictions in the deed,
and by permitting non-Caucasians to enter and occupy the premises. The trial
court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, the California court of appeals
affirmed,2 and hearing was denied by the state supreme court. On certiorari
the United States Supreme Court held, affirmed, Chief Justice Vinson dis-
senting. An award of damages by a state court for breach of racial restrictive
covenants would constitute state action which would deprive the excluded
class of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031 (1953).
Prior to 1948 it had been assumed by the state courts that an action for
damages would lie for breach of a racial restrictive covenant.3 In that year
the United States Supreme Court decided the Restrictive Covenant Cases,
4
which held that in granting specific performance of racial restrictive covenants
the state courts acted to deny members of the excluded class equal protection
of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion made
clear that the covenants, standing alone, are not constitutionally invalid5 inas-
much as the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed only against
state action.6 Judicial enforcement of the covenant is the state action pro-
scribed.7 The opinion was not clear, however, as to the scope of the rule
stated. 8 Left for deternination was the question whether the doctrine extended
to state court judgments for damages for breach of restrictive covenants. The
issue was first squarely confronted in Weiss v. Leaon,0 in which the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that a judgment for damages is not precluded by the
1 The agreement provided that no part of the restricted realty be used or occupied by
any person or persons not wholly of the white or Caucasian race, and that the restriction
should be incorporated in all papers and transfers of the lots. The agreement is quoted in
part in Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App. (2d) 534 at 536, 247 P. (2d) 99 (1952).
2 Barrows v. Jackson, note 1 supra.
3 Eason v. Buffaloe, 198 N.C. 520, 152 S.E. 496 (1930); Chandler v. Zeigler, 88
Colo. 1, 291 P. 822 (1930); Wyatt v. Adair, 215 Ala. 363, 110 S. 801 (1926). The last
named case was an action for breach of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
4 Shelley v. Kraemer, McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948); Hurd v.
Hodge, Urciolo v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 68 S.Ct. 847 (1948). The latter two cases arose
in the District of Columbia. Inasmuch as the Fourteenth Amendment is directed at state
action, note 7 infra, the decisions therein were based on 14 Stat. L. 27 (1866), 8 U.S.C.
(1946) §42. For convenience these four cases will be referred to as the Restrictive
Covenant Cases.
5 Shelley v. Kraemer, note 4 supra, at 13.
o Ibid. And see Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883).
7 "It is clear that but for active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full
panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question
without restraint." Shelley v. Kraemer, note 4 supra, at 19.
8 See Groves, "Judicial Interpretation of the Holdings of the United States Supreme
Court in the Restrictive Covenant Cases," 45 ILL. L. REv. 614 (1950).
9 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W. (2d) 127 (1949).
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Fourteenth Amendment.'0 The court in that case confined the holding of the
Restrictive Covenant Cases to equitable decrees operating directly upon members
of the excluded class. A broader construction was adopted by the Michigan
court in Phillips v. Naff," which held that an action for damages is an indirect
method of enforcement which operates "to inhibit freedom of purchase by those
against whom the discrimination is directed."' 2 The principal case likewise
reasons that to compel the grantor to respond in damages amounts to state
sanction which encourages the use of restrictive covenants.' 3 The Supreme
Court thus clarifies its holding in the Restrictive Covenant Cases by declaring
that an award of damages constitutes state action which has the indirect effect
of requiring members of the excluded class to pay a higher price for restricted
land, i.e., a price inclusive of anticipated potential damages which the seller
might incur. In drawing no distinction between equitable and legal enforce-
ment of racial restrictive covenants in applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court logically extends the rule of its earlier decisions. The threat of retribution
in the form of damages is as effective as injunctive relief in facilitating the
continued discrimination which the amendment seeks to prevent. The dissent
does not take issue with this conclusion,' 4 but rather argues that the Court
violates a recognized self-imposed restriction on jurisdiction by deciding a con-
stitutional issue which is raised in defense by a party not within the class whose
constitutional rights are allegedly infringed.' 5 In substance, the objection of
the Chief Justice goes to the admitted absence of an identifiable non-Caucasian
who is denied rights of property.16 Inasmuch as the application of the rule
denying standing to raise another's rights would effectively have denied the
adjudication of constitutional rights under the facts of the principal case, it
10 A like decision was reached by the Oklahoma court in Correll v. Earley, 205 Okla.
366, 237 P. (2d) 1017 (1951). The suit was brought in tort for conspiracy to injure the
value of plaintiff's property.
11332 Mich. 389, 52 N.W. (2d) 158 (1952).
12 Id. at 401. In accord with the Michigan decision, see Roberts v. Curtis, (D.C. D.C.
1950) 93 F. Supp. 604.
13 "If the state may thus punish respondent for her failure to carry out the covenant,
she is coerced to continue to use her property in a discriminatory manner, which in essence
is the purpose of the covenant." Principal case at 254.
14 "Coercion might result on the minds of some Caucasian property owners who have
signed a covenant such as this, for they may now feel an economic compulsion to abide
by their agreements." Dissent in principal case at 268. It is significant that Chief Justice
Vinson, who wrote the dissenting opinion, was also the author of the opinions in the
Restricted Covenant Cases.
'5 "This deep-rooted, vital doctrine demands that the Court refrain from deciding a
constitutional issue until it has a party before it who has standing to raise the issue."
Dissent in principal case at 264, citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972
(1939) (concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter); Stearns v. Wood, 236 U.S. 75,
35 S.Ct. 229 (1915); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 42 S.Ct. 274 (1922).
16 The requirement of standing inherent in the doctrine of "party in interest" has its
basis in the constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "cases"
or "controversies." See Coleman v. Miller, note 15 supra. The principal case holds that
the jurisdictional requirement is satisfied, since judgment against respondent would con-
stitute a direct, pocketbook injury in an award of damages. The point of departure in the
dissent is not that there was no "case or controversy," but that there was no "party in
interest" to raise the constitutional issue.
RECENT DECISIONS
would seem that the majority was correct in proceeding without regard to its
usual rule of practiceY1 Procedural proscriptions on power which are intended
to define the scope of the doctrine of judicial review of executive and legislative
action should not prevail in such unique situations where the action of a state
court would result in a denial of constitutional rights and would render it
difficult, if not impossible, for the persons whose rights are asserted to present
their grievances before any court. Though there is much to be commended
in the consistent application of rules of practice, the more fundamental task
of the Court is to render meaningful the guarantees of the Constitution.
Raymond R. Trombadore, S.Ed.
1,For cases in which the rule was apparently relaxed, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925); Columbia Bro'adcasting System v. United States, 316
U.S. 407, 62 S.Ct. 1194 (1942); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7 (1915).
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